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Abstract 
The offshore industry in the North Sea has gone from a very high risk level for employees some 30– 40 years ago, to a low level. The paper 
reviews the statistics brieﬂy and discusses the implications of the low level. There has from the beginning of the operations been strong focus on 
emergency preparedness, due to the remoteness of the operations mostly far from shore. But there will always have to be a balance between the focus 
on preventative safety efforts and the extent of emergency preparedness provisions. This is discussed in detail, based on an extensive evaluation of the 
adequacy of emergency preparedness provisions recently performed. The main ﬁndings are presented, and the robustness  and validity of the approach 
is discussed, together with implications of the rare major accidents. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background 
The North Sea1 offshore industry is almost 50 years, from its modest start around 1960. During the ﬁrst two decenniums there 
were many fatal accidents and the industry had a bad reputation. In Norway at least, Norwegians after some time gained experience to 
the extent that they could take over the responsibility gradually for the operations, and from around 1980 national control philosophies, 
attitudes and cultures started to take precedence over US inspired cultures, values and organisations. 
During the ﬁrst 20 years, there were several major accidents on installations and during helicopter transportation of personnel to/ 
from shore, in addition to numerous occupational accidents, including a number of fatal diver accidents. Disasters were certainly 
not too few in those days. Norway had several large helicopter accidents during the 1970s, in most cases without survivors at all. Not so 
many occurred in the UK sector in the 1970s, but here on the other hand, there were several fatal accidents during the 1980s. 
Abbreviations: ALARP, as low as reasonably practicable; FAR, fatal accident rate; HES, health, environment and safety; MMS, Minerals Management Service; MTO, Man, 
Technology  and Organisation;  OGP, oil and gas  producers; ONGC,  Oil & Natural Gas Company [of India]; Pemex, Petróleos Mexicanos; PRA, probabilistic risk assessment; 
PSA, The Petroleum Safety Authority [Norway]; QRA, quantitative risk assessment; RNNP, risk level in Norwegian petroleum [activity]; SAR, search and rescue; TLP, tension 
leg platform. 
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1 ‘North Sea’ is in this paper used as the short expression for all North European waters north of the English Channel with offshore activity, including Norwegian Sea, 
Barents Sea, North Atlantic and West of Shetland, but not northern Russian waters. 
’Major accident’ in the offshore industry is often understood to be an accident sequence that is out of control and that has the 
potential to cause ﬁve fatalities or more. This may be for instance gas leaks where ignition has occurred or, in the case of structural 
failure, where at least local structural failure has occurred. This interpretation is in accordance with HSE’s deﬁnition (HSE, 2005), but is 
not straightforward to use, due to the reference to ‘potential to cause ﬁve fatalities or more’. This is discussed to some extent in 
Vinnem et al. (2010). 
With respect to major accidents on installations, the last multi fatality major accident in the North Sea occurred in July 1988, with 
loss of 167 lives on Piper Alpha, due to ﬁre and explosions, following an uncontrolled gas release (Cullen, 1990). This was the worst loss 
of lives in the offshore industry, exceeding quite distinctly the loss of 123 lives in the Norwegian sector some 8 years earlier, with the 
capsize of the ﬂotel Alexander L. Kielland in March 1980 (NOU, 1981). 
After 1988 however, no major accidents have occurred on installations in the North Sea, but some multi fatality helicopter 
accidents have occurred. The last time emergency evacuation of an installation was performed in the Norwegian sector was in 1985, 
following an ignited shallow gas2 blowout, which resulted in a severe explosion and a long lasting ﬁre (NOU, 1986). A reservoir gas 
blowout occurred on the Norwegian installation ‘Snorre Alpha’ in 2004 without fatalities. It is not obvious whether this event shall be 
classiﬁed as ‘major accident’ or not, se further discussion in Section 5. 
Following some of the major accidents in the Norwegian sector up until 1980, it became apparent that evacuation means had to be 
improved in relation to what had been inherited from the marine industry, lifeboats and life rafts. The covered lifeboats were 
launched by two wire falls, with two hooks that needed to be load free simultaneously in order to be able to release the hooks and 
move the boat away from the installation. Such release failed in many cases, and many boats ended up being crushed against the 
structure, such as in the case of Alexander L. Kielland accident. 
Several improvements were developed in order to improve this situation. But none of these improvements have been tested in real 
cases since developed. Based on experience data, it is therefore impossible to establish whether the emergency preparedness is 
adequate or not, or whether the trend is positive or negative. This was the background to the study presented in the following, a need 
to establish as far as possible the status and the trends. 
The scope of the paper is limited to conditions in the North Sea. It is nevertheless instructive to make reference to the reservoir 
blowout on the ‘Deepwater Horison’ (Department of the Interior, 2010a), with the resulting explosion, long lasting ﬁre and 
subsequent sinking of the installation. Eleven fatalities occurred prior to evacuation by conventional lifeboats, and a massive subsea 
oil spill which at the time of writing has not been stopped, make this the worst major accident in the Gulf of Mexico for a very long time. 
1.2. Particularities of offshore emergency preparedness 
In the southern North Sea the installations are small, often not normally manned, several installations are often interconnected 
through a set of bridges, water depth is shallow and the installations are sometimes quite near to shore. These descriptions are 
typical for southern UK sector, Danish and Dutch sectors. 
The installations in the northern North Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, West of Shetland and North Atlantic are not like this at 
all, they are large, some with populations in the several hundreds, semi-deep or deep water depth and typically more than 100 
km distance from shore to the installation. This remoteness implies that in the case of an emergency, the installation has to be self 
sufﬁcient with respect to resources as well as on-scene emergency management. 
The remoteness and the need to be fully self sufﬁcient is the most particular aspect with respect to emergency preparedness. 
But there are also offshore operations in other sectors worldwide that are similarly remote. The harsh environmental conditions in 
combination with the remoteness are probably the unique aspect of the northern European operations. The remoteness also implies 
that helicopters cannot be relied upon in an emergency, onshore helicopter will typically have a response time of at least 60 min 
after scrambling. Helicopters may also be prevented from being used, due to the accident scenario. Offshore operations may in 
the future expend into offshore arctic regions. The experience in the North Sea will also be useful in order to formulate 
requirements for emergency preparedness in offshore arctic regions. 
1.3. Objectives of the paper 
The objectives of the paper are to describe the methodology that was chosen in a recent study in order to evaluate the adequacy 
of the emergency preparedness arrangements for the Norwegian offshore sector, and to evaluate whether recent improvements 
have had an effect or not. The challenges for the methodology are outlined above, the lack of experience data on which the study 
could be based. 
The objectives are further to discuss the ﬁndings of the study and the robustness and validity of the conclusions from the study. 
Finally, the objective is to discuss the balance between preventative safety efforts and emergency preparedness, should these 
two be considered independently, or is there a basis for a balanced consideration. This is particularly relevant in relation to authority 
requirements. 
2 Shallow gas implies small gas pockets usually few hundred meters below seaﬂoor, where drilling operations are performed without pressure control devices.
1.4. Scope and limitations of the emergency preparedness study 
The purpose of the study was to give an overview of the strengths and weaknesses in the emergency preparedness offshore 
in an MTO (Man, Technology and Organisation) perspective, and to assess the effects of those improvements that have been 
implemented over the last 10 years (Vinnem, 2008b). 
Oil spill emergency preparedness was not to be covered by the study. The signiﬁcance of this aspect has been emphasized strongly 
by the ‘Deepwater Horizon’ oil spill (Department of the Interior, 2010a), but the study was completed some 15 months before this 
accident occurred in April 2010. 
Another limitation was concerned with movement of large personnel groups on severe weather warning. Traditionally this has 
not been done in the North Sea, but has been the rule in the Gulf of Mexico for many years. Recently however, it has been concluded 
that some old installations in the Norwegian sector are vulnerable to wave impact, due to subsidence of the formation and the 
structure, thus resulting in insufﬁcient air gap between the lowest deck and the sea level in extreme storm conditions. These 
installations are demanned on severe weather warning. During the last few years, some installations have further been found to 
have lifeboat deﬁciencies to the extent that safe evacuation in severe weather could not be ensured. Both these scenarios have 
caused a need for movement of large personnel groups if certain wind and weather conditions are forecasted. These large scale 
movements of personnel were also outside the scope of the study. 
The main focus areas of the study were the following topics: 
• Primary evacuation means for emergency evacuation.
• Operational limitations for rescue of personnel in the sea.
• Capabilities and qualiﬁcations of offshore emergency organisation.
• Capacity utilisation of offshore emergency resources.
• Perceived emergency preparedness level by the offshore population. 
The methodology adopted in the study is presented in Section 3.1, followed by an overview of input data in Section 3.2, and the
main ﬁndings in Section 3.3. A discussion of preventative safety versus emergency preparedness is presented in Section 4, followed 
by a more general discussion in Section 5. Risk levels for offshore installations in the North Sea provide an important background 
to the discussion, especially with respect to the discussion of accident prevention versus mitigation in Section 4. The risk levels are 
presented in Section 2 below. 
2. Overview of risk levels
2.1 Historic perspective 
2.1.1. Offshore installations 
An extensive analysis of risk levels has been made in Vinnem (2008b), based on data from Norway and UK, from which Fig. 1 is 
taken. Fig. 1 presents the long term trends of fatalities per 100 million manhours (FAR values) over 40 years, limited to occupational 
accidents in the Norwegian offshore sector. Extensive reductions were achieved in the ﬁrst 20 years. Obviously, the FAR levels in the last 
20 years are more stable. 
It is argued in Vinnem (2008b) that a 10 year average value should be used. The value presented in Vinnem (2008b) is based on 
the period 1987–2006. If the same approach is used with data 
for the period 1999–2008, the values are slightly lower than for the previous period: 
• Production installations: 0.58 fatalities per 100 million exposure hours. 
• Mobile installations: 0.68 fatalities per 100 million exposure hours. 
The mobile installations are mainly mobile drilling units in addition to ﬂotels, which are mobile accommodation units. A
comparison with UK sector is presented in PSA (2008), as average values for the entire Norwegian and UK sectors. The values presented in 
Department of the Interior (2010a) are per manhour, whereas the presentation in Vinnem (2008b) is based on exposure hours, 
i.e. the double value of the manhours.3 The following values are presented: 
• UK sector: 1.89 fatalities per 100 million exposure hours. 
• Norwegian sector: 0.47 fatalities per 100 million exposure hours. 
The values in Department of the Interior (2010a) also include vessels of different types, some of which have higher fatality risk
levels than production and mobile drilling units. Further details are presented in Department of the Interior (2010a). 
Various sources and considerations are reviewed and discussed in Vinnem (2008b) with respect to risk associated with major
accidents, in spite of the fact that none have occurred during the last 20 years. The following values are calculated for the Norwegian 
sector: 
• Production installations: 0.59 fatalities per 100 million exposure hours. 
• Mobile installations: 1.40 fatalities per 100 million exposure hours. 
Various sources are reviewed and discussed in Vinnem (2008b) also with respect to risk associated with major accidents during
helicopter transportation. The following value is calculated for the future helicopter risk with new helicopter types taking over the 
majority of the transportation: 
• Offshore installations: 90 fatalities per 100 million person ﬂight hours. 
The data sources reviewed and discussed in Vinnem (2008b) may be used in order to illustrate current risk levels as well as the
risk levels some 12 years and 22 years ago. The same approach as in Vinnem (2008b) is used in order to illustrate the risk levels in 1987 
and 1997 as opposed to 2009, where contributions from occupational accidents as well as major accidents on installations and 
during helicopter transportation. 
Fig. 2 shows the extensive differences over a period of about 22 years. For the values in 1987, the risk levels have been 
calculated purely based on accident statistics for the period 1978– 1987, due to the signiﬁcant number of fatal accidents in this period. 
The effect of the Alexander L. Kielland accident is also very obvious. 
2.1.2. Helicopter accidents and ditching 
One type of accidents and incidents that has been somewhat more frequent is helicopter accidents and ditching (see OLF, 2000). 
This type of accidents also has relevance for emergency assistance planning. Fig. 3 presents an overview of accidents and incidents 
in the North Sea, based on Vinnem (2008b) with addition of a recent incident. The majority of the data is from UK and Norway, with one 
accident in Dutch sector. The events ‘G’, ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘L’ were of such nature that survival was not possible. The most notable events from a 
rescue point of view are the controlled emergency landings in July’88, November’88, January’95, January’96 and February’09. The 
helicopter capsized only in the November’88 incident, this occurred on short distance from an installation, and the rescue operations 
occurred within short time. In the other emergency landings on water, the helicopter remained upright for some time, and the rescue 
was much more delayed due to long distance, in the order of 1 h or slightly more. 
Prior to the period shown in Fig. 3 there were several fatal helicopter accidents in the UK sector in the 1980s, whereas there were 
several fatal helicopter accidents in the Norwegian sector in the 1970s. 
There has been a signiﬁcant improvement in the occurrence of fatal helicopter accidents in the last 20 years; the resulting risk level 
was indicated in Section 2.1.1. Of those events in Fig. 3 where there were survivors, the following means of rescue were used: 
3  Offshore work rotation is 12 h on-duty and 12 h off-duty, thus total exposure hours (on-duty and off-duty) are the double of on-duty manhours. 
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• SAR helicopter: three incidents (of which two used both SAR and MOB boat).
• MOB boat: six incidents (of which two used both SAR and MOB boat). 
• Lifeboat: one incident (in which SAR and a lifeboat were used). 
With respect to helicopter accidents and incidents, there is actually some experience data with respect to successful rescue 
of personnel. The longest pickup times in Fig. 3 were somewhat in excess of 1 h, but less than 90 min. 
2.1.1. Summary: emergency evacuation 
It has been demonstrated that in the Norwegian sector, no emergency evacuations have taken place after 
1985, similarly none after 1988 in the UK sector. From helicopter accidents and incidents, there have been ﬁve 
fatal accidents in the last 20 years, and eight cases where rescue operations from the sea was required. 
Worldwide operations are therefore considered as a possible alternative source of information. 
2.2. Signiﬁcance of worldwide experience 
It should ﬁrst of all be noted that helicopter accidents are not included in the comparison with worldwide 
operations. This is because helicopter safety standards are considered to be signiﬁcantly better in the North Sea 
operations, compared to worldwide operations (SINTEF, 2010). 
The most extensive source on accidents in the worldwide offshore industry (as well as onshore operations) is 
the OGP annual statistical summaries, which have been published since 1998, the last report available refers to 
2006 data (OGP, 2006). A summary of worldwide risk levels based on OGP data was presented in Vinnem (2008b). 
The report covers occupational accidents, major accidents and transportation accidents, for company personnel as 
well as contractors. The number of manhours included has increased by more than 150% during the period, and 
corresponds in 2007 to 650 million manhours, from 39 companies in 75 countries. 
There is however, one critical limitation on the OGP data, which is clearly demonstrated by values in 2001, 2005 and 
2007. The cap- size of P-36 offshore Brazil in 2001 following an explosion and ﬁre which resulted in 11 fatalities is not 
included in the OGP values. If included, it would bring up the number of deaths from 19 to 30. In 2005 the total 
number of deaths in the OGP analysis is 10. There was on the other hand, one major ﬁre and explosion on the 
Bombay High ﬁeld, operated by ONGC in India. This accident resulted in 22 fatalities, which if included, would affect 
the value for 2005 considerably. The same applies to 2007, ﬁve fatalities are reported by OGP, excluding fatalities on 
attending vessels. The accident that Pemex had in October 2007 as a consequence of severe weather, with 22 
fatalities, is not included. It is not known what other accidents that are not included in the OGP statistics, but that 
would not be major accidents. 
Fig. 4 attempts to illustrate what the effect of inclusion of these additional major accidents in 2001, 2005 and 
2007 would be, when fatalities and assumed manhours for the three companies in question are included in 2001, 
2005 and 2007. The number of employees was found in the company web-pages, from which offshore manhours 
could be ‘guestimated’. Fig. 4 is based on offshore exposure hours, including on-duty as well as off-duty hours. 
It should be noted that the effect of additional companies is only considered in the years where the accidents 
occurred, 2001, 2005 and 2007. In fact we do not know if these operators had other fatal accidents in the years in 
question. If this is the case, the values in Fig. 4 represent under-prediction. 
Fig. 4 presents the trend of offshore Fatal Accident Rates 1997– 2007, presented by OGP annual reports and the 
corrections given above. The generally falling trend in the period is obvious. 
As noted above, the extra manhours from the companies with the additional accidents are only included in 
the years where they had the accidents. Fig. 5 presents an alternative evaluation, where manhours from these 
companies are added in all years, assuming 5% annual increase. In addition, the values are presented as rolling 3 
year average values. 
Fig. 5 demonstrated an overall falling trend, with levels that are comparable to those presented in Fig. 2. 
Helicopter fatalities are as noted above not included. 
The values stated in this section indicate a return period of 30– 50 years for major accidents in the Norwegian 
sector. The absence of major accidents during the last 25 years is thus not at all sufﬁcient to conclude what a 
typical frequency may be. 
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Fig. 4. Worldwide trend, offshore Fatal Accident Rate, based on OGP reporting. 
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Fig. 5. Worldwide trend, offshore Fatal Accident Rate, 3 year rolling average, based on OGP reporting and additional companies. 
3. Emergency preparedness study
3.1 Methodology used in the study 
3.1.1. Challenges 
There are several possible approaches that could be used for a study like the actual one. If there had been a lot of incidents and 
accidents where emergency evacuation and/or rescue had taken place, the study could have been based on analysis of experience 
from accidents and incidents. But as already pointed out, the cases where emergency preparedness solutions and arrangements have 
been tested in real life are virtually non existent during the last 25 years in the entire North Sea, except in the case of ditching of 
helicopters. And those solutions that are considered best practice currently have never been tested in real cases, only in training 
scenarios, simulation and model tests. 
We may therefore ‘complain’ that disasters have become ‘too rare’ in the North Sea, at least for an event based analysis of 
experience. Other aspects are also inﬂuenced by the lack of actual experience data, such as the ability to have feedback on the 
performance of the emergency arrangements in real life usage. There has been little or no further development for many years of 
essential emergency equipment, such as freefall lifeboats, until the problems were discovered on some North Sea boats in 2005, see 
further discussion in Section 3.3.1. 
In any case, it needs to be stated clearly that the lack of experience data is certainly very good news, it conﬁrms that the accident 
prevention efforts have been successful for many years. 
If we turn to worldwide operations there are also quite recent accidents and incidents where emergency arrangements have been 
used, but the equipment and training standards are so different, that there would be little or no point in using these cases to 
evaluate current standards in the North Sea. 
Another possible approach could imply the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment studies which are in fact carried out for all off- 
shore installations under current legislation, especially in the UK and Norway. But these PRA studies (or QRA studies as they are often 
called) are often not very detailed, especially not for the consequences relating to how emergency preparedness arrangements 
affect the risk picture. The lack of experience data also comes into play here, because the lack of data implies that the results of the 
QRA studies with respect to emergency preparedness are quite coarse and rather uncertain. 
At the same time, it was considered important to have as much as possible factual basis for observations and conclusions, this was 
considered essential as much of the discussion of emergency preparedness is rather emotions based, with little or no basis in 
facts. A considerable effort was made in order to collect relevant data, and to supplement this with qualitative information from 
seminars, interviews, questionnaire surveys, etc. Data from exercises and training may also be valuable data, and some actual 
experience data from use of emergency resources are available. 
It is essential to recognize that the use of data will be limited by uncertainty, unrepresentativeness, as well as interpretation 
challenges. It is therefore essential to supplement data with qualitative evaluations and assessments, as well as ﬁndings from audits 
and investigations. 
3.1.2. Adopted approach 
The main thrust of the approach was to employ a social science inspired triangulation principle whereby the ﬁndings and conclusions 
could be based on preferably at least two different types of sources and inputs. In the study report it was considered as essential to 
present the factual data separately from the evaluations that were performed based on the available input. This is also to some extent 
implemented in the paper, where an extract of the data basis is presented in Section 3.2, and the main evaluations are presented in 
Section 3.3. 
The following is a brief deﬁnition of the main steps of the methodology which was used in the study: 
1. The scope of the study was structured into main topics and sub- topics as presented in Section 3.1.3 below. 
2. For each topic it was attempted to provide at least two different data sources, either quantitative or qualitative data, with
emphasis on consideration of topics in an MTO perspective, as discussed below in Section 3.1.4. 
3. Qualitative evaluations were performed based on the available information, in relation to regulatory requirements, applicable 
standards, as well as recognized industry practice. 
4. Where necessary, trade-offs were considered with a view to the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle. 
5. All topics were considered in parallel in order to draw the ﬁnal conclusion about the overall status of the emergency preparedness
for personnel in the Norwegian sector. 
3.1.3. Main topics 
The main topics were structured in three main focus areas. The main and the detailed topics are the following: 
• Accidents originating on the installation: 
0   Combatment on the installations. 
0  Emergency evacuation by lifeboats. 
0  Secondary escape to sea level. 
• Accidents due to external events: 
0  Helicopter ditching within safety zone.
0  Emergency evacuation by lifeboats.
• Emergency resources:
0   Area based emergency preparedness. 
0  Trafﬁc surveillance by radar. 
0  Survival, localization and rescue from the sea.
0  Medical evacuation to shore.
3.1.4. Focus on MTO aspects 
The mandate for the study emphasized that the evaluation should be taking an MTO perspective. As a starting point, it is re- 
quired to consider what are the implications of such a perspective. The most obvious is to consider how emergency operations may fail 
due to for instance human errors. The example cited below from Mexico in October 2007, see Table 1, is an illustration of such effects. 
But often human operators provide the last option for rectiﬁcation. In the Snorre Alpha subsea gas blowout, see Section 5, it was 
observed that the emergency management onboard the installation took decisions and implemented combatment actions that 
were not part of the emergency instructions. Their skills and experience were the basis for these actions, which were claimed to be 
signiﬁcantly contributing to the avoidance of loss of life in that particular accident. This event provides a clear demonstration of the 
positive potential that is implied in the MTO approach, this is often overlooked. 
The relevance of the negative effects of the MTO approach is demonstrated clearly over and over again, if major disasters are 
considered. If for instance the last major accident involving failure of evacuation facilities is considered, this may be illustrated clearly. 
The blowout from the Mexican mobile drilling unit Usumacinta 23. October 2007, resulted in 22 fatalities during emergency 
evacuation (Batelle, 2008). The following are found as the main causes of the high loss of lives: 
• All crew members (about 80 persons) were evacuated by means of one covered lifeboat and one lifesaving capsule. None were
wearing survival suits, and several people did not wear lifewest. 
• The launching of both evacuation means was successful.
• After some time, both the lifeboat and the capsule capsized, probably because hatches were opened to get fresh air and to be
able to see. Lack of command structure, training and competence appear to have been contributing factors. 
• Vessels in the area and Mexican navy attempted to rescue people in the sea and in evacuation facilities, but 22 persons
drowned, of which two crew members from one of the vessels involved in the rescue attempts. The weather conditions were
severe, 22 m/s wind and 8–9 m waves. 
• The investigation (PSA, 2008) concluded with several weaknesses in procedures, competence and cultural aspects. 
A brief overview of some well known major accidents and the inﬂuence of human and organisational errors is presented in Table 
1, based on Vinnem (2007). A general evaluation of MTO aspects involved in emergency evacuation is given in Skogdalen and Vinnem 
(2008). The table has been supplemented by the Deep- water Horizon accident for the purpose of completeness. 
The following observations may be made from Table 1: 
• Many of the investigations were performed at a time when MTO aspects were not focused upon, hence some information is 
unknown. Investigation reports are not available for all accidents implying also some unknown information. Organizational errors
sometimes have to be inferred from the descriptions. 
• In all of these cases, either human errors or organizational errors or both types of failures contributed to the severe 
consequences. 
• Organizational errors found in all cases, except in two cases where the information is unavailable, either due to no survivors
or due to lack of formal investigation report. 
• Most of the fatalities have occurred during evacuation and rescue operations, but many of the organizational errors occurred in
the phases prior to initiating the evacuation operations. The most common errors are those occurring in the management and
supervision. 
With respect to observations from these accidents and identiﬁcation of lessons learned for risk reduction actions, the following 
may be noted: 
• The ﬁrst six accidents in  Table 1 contributed to the requirement for an improved lifeboat concept, the freefall li feboat. This has been 
compulsory on production installations in the Norwegian sector for more than 20 years. But no other country has adopted the same 
approach, which is very surprising, especially in areas with severe environmental conditions.
Table 1 
Overview of human and organizational errors and technical faults in some well known offshore major accidents. 
Accident Description Human errors Organizational errors Technical faults 
Ekoﬁsk Alpha (Norway, Riser rupture, explosion, ﬁre Error in operation of lifesaving Substandard corrosion protection not Failure of riser due to 
1975) three fatalities during capsule detected and discovered external corrosion 
evacuation 
Deep Sea Driller Grounding during transit to Investigation claims errors by Errors in onshore operational planning of Engine failure, lifeboat 
(Norway, 1976) shore six fatalities during captain, this is doubtful transit movement, and in emergency 
evacuation management 
Alexander L. Kielland Structural failure, capsizing Unknown Failures during emergency management Launching systems 
(Norway, 1980) 123 fatalities during and lifeboat engine 
evacuation and rescue failures 
Ocean Ranger (Canada, Capsizing on location 84 Errors when trying to close ballast Failure to provide adequate competence Failure of ballast 
1982) fatalities during evacuation valves relating to manual ballast operations control systems due to 
and rescue short circuits caused 
by sea water ingress 
Glomar Java Sea (China, Capsizing on location 81 Error in deciding when to carry Unknown Unknown due to no 
1983) fatalities during evacuation out precautionary evacuation of survivors 
and rescue personnel 
Enchova (Brazil, 1984) Blowout 36 fatalities during Error in operation of lifeboat Unknown None known 
evacuation 
Piper Alpha (UK, 1988) Explosion, ﬁre 167 fatalities Failure to follow procedures Several failures during administration of Fire walls failed when 
during evacuation and rescue major hazard activities, and emergency exposed to blast 
management loading 
Ocean Odessey (UK, Burning blowout one fatality Unknown Failures during emergency management None known 
1988) during evacuation 
West Gamma Norway, Capsizing during transit Unknown Management errors in planning of transit Equipment torn loose 
1990) between locations No fatalities operations not observing weather impact due to wave impact 
and avoiding exposure of many crew 
members to extreme weather 
Bombay High (India, Collision, explosion, ﬁre 22 Unknown Management errors when deciding to Inadequate protection 
2005) fatalities during evacuation bring supply vessel close to jacket platform of risers below deck 
and rescue in heavy swell to transfer injured person as 
well as in emergency management 
Usumacinta (Mexico, Structural failure, blowout 22 Failures by lifeboat captains likely Errors in emergency management allowing Foundation failure of 
2007) fatalities during evacuation in allowing hatches to be opened unsafe behaviour in lifeboat and capsule jack-up due to weather 
and rescue in bad weather leading to damage to 
wellhead platform 
Deepwater Horizon (US Gas/oil blowout, causing Ongoing investigations, but Anecdotal information suggests multiple Blowout preventer 
GoM, 2010 explosion and subsequent ﬁre, anecdotal information suggests organizational factors involved, involving apparently failed in 
11 fatalities on installation, several human errors made by BP as operator and several of shitting in the well for 
remaining 115 persons drilling personnel causing the subcontractors companies so far unknown 
evacuated blowout reasons 
• The remaining accidents in Table 1, with the exception of Usumacinta accident in 2007 may be considered together. In these cases
the conditions of the accident were so severe that it could not be expected that any evacuation system would be capable of
assuring safety of personnel during emergency evacuation. The risk reduction actions for these scenarios should be focused on
prevention of such scenarios through a combination of technical, human and organisational actions. For instance, the Piper Alpha
accident was inﬂuenced by a bad platform layout, lack of blast walls and a safety management system with severe faults, according to
HSE (2005). 
• The Usumacinta accident has demonstrated the importance of emergency management in order to prevent unsafe behaviour
inside lifeboat and capsule after they were water born (SINTEF, 2010). Similar faults have also been observed in other accidents, such as
Ekoﬁsk Alpha, Deep Sea Driller, Ocean Ranger, Piper Alpha and Bombay High. 
3.2. Input data 
3.2.1. Demographic data 
The Risk Level project has amongst other activities conducted large questionnaire surveys four times, with 2 year intervals 
(PSA, 2008; Tharaldsen et al., 2008; Vinnem et al., 2006). These surveys have collected large volumes of demographic data that was 
useful for the present study. A brief excerpt of some of the analyses of demographic data is presented in the following, the full 
presentation is available in Vinnem (2008a). Fig. 6 presents an overview of the average number of employees on offshore production 
installations in Norway, in the period 1996–2007. The following observations could be made from the diagram: 
• The average number of company personnel on the installations has decreased virtually continuously in the entire period. 
• The total number of average offshore employees decreased from 1996 until 2000, and has been increasing in the period after
year 2000, the variations have been taken by the contractor personnel. 
It should be noted that relatively few new installations have been commissioned in the period, virtually all of them with a lower 
manning level compared to the average level shown in Fig. 6. This implies that on old installations, the variations have been even 
more distinct. 
Fig. 7 presents an overview of the trends in average employee age in the period 2001–2007, split in three groups according to 
petroleum company, contractor company and rig owner employment. 
Fig. 7 indicates an increasing trend, whilst the survey in 2005 represents a deviation from the general trend. It may be observed 
that the results in 2005 are untypical in several respects, but no obvious explanation has been found. It could be noted that the year 
2005 has the highest number of participants of all the four surveys, nearly 10,000 participants. 
Fig. 8 presents an overview of what percentage of employees in the different age groups that have membership in the emergency 
preparedness organisation. Two types of membership in the off- shore emergency preparedness organisation are considered, those 
with demanding physical requirements to the members (smoke diving, ﬁre ﬁghting, rescue from sea, stretcher transportation, 
etc.) and those with management roles and no physical requirements. Fig. 8 is limited to those with demanding physical 
requirements. 
It is worth noting that the highest percentage of all employees that have physically demanding requirements are found in the age 
group 51–60 years. It was expected that the highest percentage would be in one of the groups with younger personnel. One 
possible explanation is that often such positions are deﬁned for supervisory personnel, which tend to be the oldest personnel. 
Another possible factor is that membership in the emergency organizations carries quite high ﬁxed payment (i.e. independently of 
whether emergencies occur or not), which implies that personnel tend to hang onto such positions even if their physical ﬁtness 
may have been reduced such that younger personnel should have taken their place. 
3.2.2. Perceived emergency preparedness level 
One of the most remarkable ﬁndings from the analyses of questionnaire survey data, was the signiﬁcant improvement of the 
experienced level of emergency preparedness.  The question in the survey was; ‘The emergency preparedness on the installation is 
good’, with a ﬁve point scale ranging from ‘Agree completely’ to ‘Disagree completely’. The ﬁve reply categories are given numerical 
values 1–5 in the calculation of average scores. This implies that the lower the average score is, the closer is the average reply to 
‘Agree completely’. Fig. 9 presents the clear positive trend in the four surveys on this question.4 The diagram shows that personnel with 
emergency preparedness functions and those without such functions all have the same extent of improvement of their view of goodness 
of the emergency preparedness arrangements. But those with emergency functions are in average somewhat more positive to the 
emergency capabilities. It could be noted that the improvement shown in Fig. 9 is one of the strongest effects seen in this survey over 
the 7 years. 
Fig. 10 presents the same data, but split in another manner. Three areas in the Norwegian sector have an extensive cooperation 
scheme for emergency preparedness, called ‘area based emergency preparedness’ (Vinnem, 2008a). This involves cooperation between 
all installations in the area and common marine resources, typically an offshore based fully equipped All Weather SAR helicopter, an 
advanced, high speed standby vessel, and common trafﬁc center for surveillance against passing vessels on collision course. These three 
area are referred to in Fig. 10 as ‘Area 1’; ‘Area 2’ and ‘Area 3’, as opposed to those installations in areas where no cooperation has 
been formed. 
4 The survey data from 2009 were not available for the study.
It has been an intense debate between groups of offshore employees as well as between some groups and management on 
whether the cooperation scheme for emergency preparedness is an improvement or the opposite. Based on the values in Fig. 10, it 
appears that the offshore work force in these areas have the same appraisal of the positive development of the emergency 
preparedness as in those areas where no cooperation exists. It could even be argued that the score reduction is the highest in those 
areas with emergency preparedness cooperation, based on visual observations from the diagram. 
3.2.3. Use of SAR facilities 
There are ﬁve offshore based SAR helicopters in the Norwegian sector. The ﬂeet of offshore based SAR helicopters was increased 
signiﬁcantly due to the introduction of area based emergency preparedness. There are two helicopters in the southern part, two 
helicopters in the north part of the North Sea (in the actual sense of the word) and one helicopter in the Norwegian Sea (see also Fig. 10). 
One of the helicopters in the northern North Sea is not part of an area with emergency preparedness cooperation. Fig. 11 presents 
the annual distribution of missions and hours spent on these missions, for one of the helicopters in the northern North Sea, as average 
values in the period 2003–2007. The annual values are: 
• Annual number of missions: 496. 
• Annual number of operational hours: 472. 
There is also information about the ambulance missions, which are categorized into red, yellow and green criticality. The ‘red’
missions, typically 25% of all ambulance missions, are those cases where lack of rapid transfer to onshore hospital may be life 
threatening. The ‘green’ missions are those without criticality, to the extent that the personnel could wait for the next scheduled 
ﬂight, 
whereas the ‘yellow’ are the remaining missions. Based upon the values given, the number of red missions is 
typically one mission per helicopter per week. This implies that there is signiﬁcant reserve capacity in the system.  
3.2. Main ﬁndings 
3.2.1. Overall status of emergency preparedness 
Several sources of information were interpreted in combination, in order to reach the overall conclusion, that 
the overall status of emergency preparedness for personnel in the Norwegian sector is good, as outlined in the 
methodology description in Section 3.1.2. The main factors are the following: 
• The clear improvement of the perceived goodness of emergency preparedness in the period 2001–2007 as
outlined in Section 3.2.2. 
• The clearly positive effects of the changes in the last 10 years; see Section 3.3.2.
• Few negative ﬁndings in external audits and investigations of accidents and incidents. 
The signiﬁcance of the clear improvement of the perceived goodness of emergency preparedness has
already been commented upon, in relation to the effect of introduction of area based emergency preparedness, 
around 2002–2003. Some union representatives have been very negative towards the area based emergency 
preparedness, claiming that the reduction of the number of standby vessels for individual installation to have a 
signiﬁcantly negative effect. The opposite view is that these often slow moving standby vessels are replaced by SAR 
helicopters and modern, high speed standby vessels as common resources. The data from the questionnaire 
survey as presented in Section 3.2.2 above has such a strong positive trend in the period with introduction of the 
area based emergency preparedness, that there is no basis to conﬁrm the negative attitude by some workforce 
representatives. 
The period 2001–2007 also covers the period in which a number of design weaknesses in freefall lifeboats have 
been discovered during testing of such lifeboats on the installations, starting in 2005. Still, the trend in the 
data in Section 3.2.2 is positive also after 2005. 
3.2.2. Effect of changes the last 10 years 
The changes that have been introduced the last 10 years are concerned with the following: 
• Area based emergency preparedness: 
o Rapid medevac capabilities for critical medical cases.
o Surveillance of external ship trafﬁc. 
o Rescue of personnel in the sea after helicopter ditching.
o Operational constraints on the basis of emergency preparedness restrictions.
• Man-over-board emergency preparedness. 
• Lifeboats.
• Survival suits. 
• Qualiﬁcations of personnel in emergency teams.
3.2.3. 
The most signiﬁcant change over the last 10 years, possibly the last 20 years, is the introduction of area 
based emergency preparedness. There are many experts and workforce representatives that agree on the 
signiﬁcance of this improvement. And there are clear indications from the questionnaire survey that the 
offshore employees also value the increased professionalism implied by this concept, see Section 3.2.2. 
In addition to those arguments that have already been mentioned, there has also been increased focus on 
operational limitations that reﬂect the capability limits of the available emergency resources. This implies for 
instance that helicopter transportation may have to be halted temporarily as long as the weather conditions are 
so severe that rescue of personnel from helicopter ditching would not be possible with the resources that are 
available. 
The most important limitation of the area based emergency preparedness is the extent of the area, which 
determines the maximum response times to the most distant installations. The requirement is to be able to 
rescue 21 persons in the sea within 120 min, independently of the environmental conditions. Some of the areas 
have an extension which is just on the borderline of meeting the requirement, without any extra margins. 
SAR helicopters have very few limitations with respect to rescue of personnel from the sea in all weather 
conditions, although evaluation by pilots suggests that a lower pick-up rate may be expected in severe 
weather conditions. The starting up of the rotor on the installation in strong wind may be a limiting factor. 
The SAR helicopters may also be used to rescue personnel outside the safety zone, but the regulatory 
requirement is limited to the safety zone. 
When helicopters are not available, man-over-board boats is the only other option, but with severe 
operational limitations with respect to sea states. 
There has been increased focus on rescue of personnel who fall in the sea, including a requirement for two 
independent systems, focus on qualiﬁcations and motivation for use of preventative measures. 
The detection of weaknesses in freefall type of lifeboats in 2005 has led to extensive studies of necessary 
improvements of freefall as well as conventional lifeboats. When these studies have been completed, it may be 
presumed that the boats will be at least as good as what was presumed at the time of installation. 
New survival suits have been developed the last 3 years as a response to weaknesses detected in association with 
tests in the area based emergency preparedness development program. These improvements are essential in 
order to allow response times up to 120 min. 
There has been increased focus on and attention to qualiﬁcations of personnel in emergency teams, including 
physical ﬁtness of personnel with demanding physical requirements, as well as competence of personnel in the 
emergency management teams. Some companies have the rule that no contractor employees shall participate in 
the emergency teams. It has been shown that the number of company personnel is reduced continuously, and 
that the average age is increasing, see Section 3.2.1, such that it be- comes more and more difﬁcult to recruit 
company personnel with necessary physical capabilities to the emergency teams. 
3.2.4. Other signiﬁcant ﬁndings 
The development of emergency preparedness during the last 10 years is mainly a story of improvements and 
success, but there are some aspects that could be further improved. These aspects mainly reﬂect the fact that 
several of the recent improvement are not based on regulatory requirements, but are voluntary 
improvements adopted by most of the companies in the industry, but not all. The aspects where further 
implementation would be preferable are the following: 
• Trafﬁc surveillance in order to prevent passing vessel trafﬁc on collision course being undetected.
• Modern, high speed standby vessels. 
• Offshore located SAR helicopters. 
There are two trafﬁc surveillance centres for ship trafﬁc monitoring based on electronic transfer of radar
signals, these cover 90% of the installations (Vinnem, 2008a). It has been observed that the surveillance performed 
by these centres is reliable, efﬁcient and imply a long warning time with ample opportunity to contact the ships in 
order to make them change course before the installation has to start preparations for shutdown and 
evacuation. The experience is that where the installation itself or its standby vessel has the responsibility for 
detection of vessels on collision course, vessels are rarely detected on collision course. As there is no reason to 
assume that there are fewer vessels on collision course in these areas, the implication is that such surveillance is 
less reliable. It would be highly preferable if all installations had trafﬁc centres to take care of the ship trafﬁc 
monitoring. 
The new generation, high speed standby vessels which includes an internal docking facility for lifeboats has so far 
only been com- missioned for areas with cooperation agreements, which implies that only a small fraction of all 
standby vessels are of this standard. It would be a clear advantage if more vessels of this generation were 
contracted by the installations which are not part of cooperation areas. 
The offshore  located  SAR helicopters  represent  a  signiﬁcant improvement of the  emergency  preparedness,  not  
the  least  due to the ability to carry out medevac in cases where it is essential for the patient’s chance of survival 
to arrive at an onshore hospital within 2–3 h. In a study (OLF, 2000) prior to introducing the area based emergency 
preparedness it was assumed that there would be about 15 cases with such critical emergency patient transfer 
for the entire Norwegian sector per year. The experience with ﬁve helicopters is that each helicopter carries out 
about one such transfer per week (‘red’ missions), i.e. about 250 cases per year. It could be added that the ﬁve 
helicopters cover installations with about 80% of the offshore population as far as production installations are 
concerned (see Vinnem, 2008a). It is assumed that the fraction is lower for mobile drilling units, but there are no 
available data in order to substantiate this assumption. There is most probably about 25–30% of the offshore 
workforce who does not have access to such helicopters and would therefore have somewhat lower survival chances 
in case of very serious injury or illness. This could be improved if more areas had access to offshore located SAR 
helicopters. 
3.3. Robustness and validity 
Robustness and validity are essential aspects of study like the present, and is a challenge due to the lack of 
actual experience data. The robustness is further a challenge, due to the fact that at least one of the ﬁndings of 
the study is quite controversial. As al- ready discussed, the data relating to the perceived goodness of the 
emergency preparedness are quite clear with respect to the improvement of perceived goodness as reported 
in Figs. 9 and 10 and discussed in Section 3.2.2. But a few of the unions who organize offshore employees have 
been strongly against the area based emergency preparedness cooperation, claiming that the loss of individual 
standby vessels for each installation is a signiﬁcant reduction of emergency preparedness. The arguments focus 
mainly on the perceived assurance implied by a vessel that may be observed continuously by the offshore 
workforce, rather than actual achievements that the vessels are expected to be able to perform. 
This argument is on the other hand somewhat difﬁcult to accept, as the data reported in Figs. 9 and 10 are 
essentially demonstrating that the perceived quality of the emergency preparedness has improved continuously 
in the period, in spite of introduction of area based emergency preparedness and detection of weaknesses in 
lifeboats. The data further shows that the perceived quality has improved actually also on installations which 
are part of the area based emergency cooperation. The effect is quite strong, and is in direct contradiction to what 
has been claimed by these unions. 
Some HES experts have remarked that those unions that are the strongest opposition to the area based 
cooperation are those that also have members onboard the standby vessels, i.e. those that may be negatively 
affected by the reduction in the number of standby vessels. The implication of this is a possible hint that the 
opposition is inﬂuenced by arguments relating to job security of standby vessel crew members, rather than 
feeling of assurance of the employees on offshore installations. 
It is noteworthy that there are other unions, of which two are large unions with a high membership of 
offshore employees that are in favour of the area based cooperation. One of these unions has been a very 
clear supporter of the area based cooperation and has taken actively part in the development of for 
instance the new generation of standby vessels. Also employer representatives clearly support the improvement 
and increased professional- ism that are implied by the area based emergency preparedness. 
This implies that one of the main ﬁndings of the study is sup- ported by the data from the questionnaire as 
well as observations from interviews with a number of persons, representing employees as well as employers. This 
ﬁnding should therefore be robust. 
With a study like the present, one of the main principles to increase the robustness of conclusions is to 
ensure that there is at least two, preferably independent, sources for each main conclusion. 
Another principle that may be used in order to increase the robustness is to allow independent review and 
discussion of ﬁndings before ﬁnalisation of the conclusions. This has also been carried out in the present case. A 
separate internal reference group from PSA has reviewed the draft ﬁndings and conclusions, in addition to several 
presentations and discussions to internal groups in PSA. Also a forum with employee, employer, authorities and 
government representation has discussed the results of analysis and ﬁndings on two occasions. 
4. Preventative safety versus emergency preparedness 
The relationship between accident prevention and emergency preparedness is one interesting aspect from a
philosophical point of view that is implicitly focused upon as a result of the present study. It is emphasized that 
this aspect was not part of the study (Vinnem, 2008a). The oil companies have for some time expressed the view 
that improved accident prevention is not given any credit by the authorities. As a general viewpoint, this applies to 
prevention of injury to personnel as well as prevention of environmental damage. Norway has had for some time a 
fundamental discussion about possible permission to start exploration and production activity in some 
environmentally sensitive areas near the coast in northern Norway (not full arctic conditions, but close to arctic 
conditions). The relationship between accident prevention and emergency preparedness is one of the elements in 
that very politically sensitive discussion relating to environmental effects. The discussion in this paper will 
however, be limited to personnel safety, and not particularly focused on northern Norway. 
4.1. Regulatory requirements 
Norwegian as well as UK regulations for offshore facilities and operations have important requirements that 
affect the balance between preventative safety and emergency preparedness, but not with explicit 
requirements that may be used to determine what this balance should be. 
Norwegian regulations have requirements that call for continuous risk reduction, irrespective of the risk level. 
There should be efforts made to reduce risk through preventative or mitigation measures, and good proposals shall 
be implemented unless the negative effects of such proposals (including costs) are in gross dis- proportion to the 
beneﬁt, i.e. the risk reduction (ALARP; As Low As Reasonably Practicable). UK also has similar requirements for ALARP 
evaluations and risk reduction process. 
Both sets of regulations also have in addition some minimum requirements for preventative safety as well as 
emergency preparedness. In Norwegian regulations there is for instance a requirement to use lifeboats of the 
freefall type, and two independent systems for rescue of personnel who fall into the sea. There is also the 
requirement that when the dimensioning of passive ﬁre protection is performed, this shall be done without 
taking the effect of active ﬁre protection (such as ﬁre water) into account. 
There are further requirements that personnel may be evacuated and rescued in what is termed ‘situations 
involving hazard and accident’, i.e. major hazard scenarios deﬁned in QRA studies, accidental events of limited 
extent and situations implying temporary increase of risk (PSA, 2002). 
In the UK, there is a requirement to provide arrangements that give a ‘good prospect of escape, evacuation and 
recovery’ for all foreseeable events (HSE, 1995). 
In general there is a tendency in regulations to call for adequate emergency provisions for foreseeable 
circumstances, irrespective of what has been done in order to reduce the probability of these circumstances. Thus 
there is no right to reduce the extent of emergency preparedness provisions due to improved preventative safety. 
It is further known that companies who have argued towards Norwegian and UK authorities along the lines 
of reduction of emergency preparedness due to improved preventative safety, have received replies to the 
effect that such an approach is not viable. 
4.2. Industry viewpoints 
Several international and national standards for the offshore industry (NORSOK, 2006; ISO, 1999, 2000) 
emphasize the general risk reduction principle that priority shall as far as possible be given to measures to reduce 
the probability of accidents rather than measures to reduce the consequences of accidents. These standards 
are all referenced in for instance Norwegian legislation. The implication of such a principle is that if probability of 
accidents may be reduced, there should not be any need to improve emergency preparedness. This is the 
viewpoint often adopted by the industry, based upon the wording of the standards. 
But there may be other priorities and circumstances that will inspire the industry to improve the emergency 
preparedness arrangements. One such circumstance is the need to maintain a good reputation. Especially when 
it comes to emergency preparedness relating to environmental spill is this a signiﬁcant factor. The Norwegian 
industry is as mentioned above very keen to open up new acreage for exploration in some near-shore areas in 
northern Norway (Norwegian Sea). The debate is focused on environmental spill and environmental risk, and 
the willingness to invest in improvement of preventative measures as well as emergency preparedness is certainly 
present. This is due to authority requirements and pressure from Non-Governmental Organisations, but is also 
inﬂuenced by the need to maintain a good reputation. This has also been demonstrated by the actions taken 
by industry in order to improve oil spill containment from deep subsea wells, following the severe oil spill from 
the Deepwater Horizon blowout. 
4.3. Proposed principles for balance between preventative safety and emergency preparedness 
The balance between accident prevention and emergency preparedness is not straightforward to conclude 
on. The ﬁndings of the present study will to some extent strengthen the focus on this controversy. The question 
then becomes is there a way out of the dilemma, a way that may provide a compromise between the regulatory 
and the industry viewpoints. We will try to outline such a compromise here, through a process with four steps. 
This process is applicable under Norwegian and UK legislation, both being risk based legislation, based on the ALARP 
principle. It will not be applicable under more prescriptive legislation, such as for the US Outer Continental Shelf. It 
may be applicable in other legislations which are based on the same principles as the UK and Norwegian legislation, 
subject to evaluation in each case. This approach also fulﬁls the industry viewpoints as outlined in Section 4.2, in 
the sense that preventative measures should be given priority. The following steps are recommended: 
1. The frame conditions must always be satisﬁed, according to regulations (UK as well as Norwegian):
• Minimum requirements for preventative safety. 
• Minimum requirements for emergency preparedness. 
• Minimum requirements with respect to acceptable risk levels (upper tolerability limits). 
2. ALARP process shall be conducted according to regulations.
3. When making decisions about risk reducing measures: 
• Priority to be given to measures that may reduce probability over consequence reducing measures. 
4. If not implementing a certain emergency preparedness measure, the preferred preventative measures which
shall have to be implemented shall be speciﬁed. 
5. Discussion of ﬁndings in the study 
The implications of too rare accidents are probably most extensive for a study like the one reported in this paper.
Except for res- cue of survivors from helicopter accidents and incidents there is very little relevant experience 
data on which such a study could be based. The discussion above has outlined how the lack of data could be 
compensated for. 
Also the emergency preparedness associated with oil spill containment from deep subsea wells as demonstrated 
by the Deepwater Horizon blowout may be considered in this context. It was not until the blowout occurred that it 
was realised by BP and others (Department of the Interior, 2010b) that the technology for oil spill containment from 
such wells was far from satisfactory developed. Such events have been very rare for many decades even on a 
worldwide basis. The previous subsea well blowout with a large oil spill was the Ixtoc blowout in Mexican Gulf 
of Mexico in 1979/1980, which took almost 10 months to completely kill the blowout (Department of the 
Interior, 2010b). 
Robustness and validity are on the one hand essential aspects of the present study, and is on the other hand a 
challenge due to the lack of actual experience data. The triangulation approach that was selected is probably the 
best approach to choose in these circumstances. The approach is parallel to that chosen in the Risk Level project 
(Batelle, 2008; Vinnem, 2007), which has to some extent been remarkable in the sense that it has been possible to 
gain trust and conﬁdence by all parties, employees as well as employers, in spite of the severe mistrust when the 
project was initially launched. 
The statement ‘reasonably foreseeable’ is a key concept in some of the regulations. The question may therefore 
be to what extent the lack of major accidents creates a situation where such occurrences are no longer 
‘reasonably foreseeable’. 
It has been noted, see Sections 2.2 and 3.1, that major accidents have occurred on several occasions in other 
areas where offshore oil and gas operations take place. The last 10 years have seen accidents like P-36 (Brazil, 2001), 
Temsa (Egypt, 2004), Bombay North (India, 2005), Usumacinta (Mexico, 2007) and Deepwater Horizon (US, 2010), 
amongst which only the Temsa burning blowout did not result in major loss of lives. 
It has also been noted that in some of the near-misses that have occurred in the Norwegian sector during the last 
few years, severe accidents with major loss of life could have occurred under slightly different circumstances. This 
applies at least to the following near-misses: 
• Subsea gas blowout: The Snorre Alpha (Statoil, 2005) subsea gas blowout in November 2004 did not ignite, but 
could have ignited and thereby caused major loss of life. The foundation of one of the anchors for the TLP
could also have failed, as an alternative cause of major loss of life. The ofﬁcial investigation report (PSA, 2005) did 
not classify event as a major accident, but this debatable. 
• Major gas release: The Visund (PSA, 2006) major gas release in 
January 2006 with initial ﬂowrate of some 900 kg/s did not ignite, but could have ignited and thereby caused
major loss of life. A less extensive, but still major gas release in the UK sector in February the same year did
actually ignited, but only minor injuries resulted. 
• Gas cloud in concrete shaft: The Statfjord Alpha (PSA, 2008) gas release in the utility shaft in May 2008 did not
ignite, but could have ignited and thereby caused major loss of life, due to the close proximity to the
accommodation module. 
It is thereby demonstrated that very good control over ignition sources and to some extent fortunate
circumstances has contributed to the fact that no major accidents with signiﬁcant loss of life have occurred for a 
long time. But these (and other) near-misses indicate that such accidents have to be classiﬁed as ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’. It would not be correct to rule out the possibility of such major events. 
As already noted, see Section 4.1, the regulations of most of the nations around the North Sea are risk based, 
implying that risk assessments are used in order to specify what safety prevention and mitigation solutions and 
actions that should be implemented. The lack of relevant experience data from emergency preparedness solutions 
and operations often imply that the risk assessments are relatively vague with respect to risk contributions from 
emergency preparedness scenarios. This is an aspect which preferably should be strengthened, and should have 
somewhat higher focus by the industry, its consultants and the authorities. 
The ﬁnal implication to be noted is that the lack of experience data may be taken as an additional indication 
that the emergency preparedness level should not be allowed to be reduced. It would probably take still a long 
period (say at least 20–30 years) with no major accidents before it could be considered relevant to take up such 
a discussion. 
6. Conclusions 
It has been demonstrated that major accidents have been rare in the North Sea waters for more than 25 years.
But the lack of experience data for the offshore areas considered does not imply that such circumstances can be 
excluded as ‘reasonably foreseeable’, occurrences in other offshore areas show that such events are possible, and 
near-misses in the North Sea have demonstrated that the potential is still present. 
In 2010 this may be further emphasized through the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Major accidents had not 
occurred in the US Gulf of Mexico water for more than 30 years, and it appears that for in- stance politicians 
virtually had ruled out the possibility of such major accidents. 
For the worldwide offshore community it will be important to strive to prevent recurrence of major accidents. 
This is clearly demonstrated by experience associated with Deepwater Horizon blow-out, where US authorities 
have put a ban on all drilling activities from ﬂoating installations for 6 months, (Department of the Interior, 
2010b). During this period it is up to the industry as well as authorities to demonstrate by the end of the period 
(or sooner) that drilling from ﬂoating installations is safe to reopen. In the case of the US Gulf of Mexico this is 
mainly based on the risk of environ- mental damage. Also major risk exposure to personnel would be expected to 
have the same effect, especially in other areas. 
The role of authorities such as Petroleum Safety Authority [Nor- way] and UK Health and Safety Executive has 
been acknowledged as crucial for such purposes for many years, as these authorities have taken a leading role 
in pushing for continuous increase in safety levels. The US Minerals Management Service (MMS) has not had a 
similar prominent role (Norwegian Research Council, 2010). This was realised by US Department of Interior shortly 
after the Deepwater Horizon blowout, when the regulatory control was transferred from MMS to a new authority, 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. This authority does not have responsibility for 
taxation and resource management, with the obvious possibility of conﬂict of interest. It has been demonstrated 
how it has been possible to conduct a robust study of the emergency preparedness arrangements and their 
status, in spite of the rare occurrences of major accidents the last 25 years in the North Sea and waters further 
north. 
The lack of experience data from relevant major accidents implies severe restrictions on use of occurrence 
data, and alternative approaches had to be chosen for the emergency preparedness study. The lack of 
occurrence data also implies that the basis for analysis of major hazard risk becomes rather vague. 
It is therefore recommended that the emergency preparedness level should not be reduced, but preference 
should still be on preventative measures. This applies to the entire North Sea area. Improvement of 
emergency preparedness standards is recommended in some other areas, such as the US Gulf of Mexico. 
In Norway at least, the main focus with respect to emergency preparedness during the last 4–5 years has 
been on hardware, 
i.e. freefall lifeboat modiﬁcations, new survival suits as well as modern, high speed standby vessels. But 
maintenance of a high emergency preparedness level is also strongly dependent on non- tangible aspects such as 
competence, training, attitudes, motivation and perception of the level of protection. The debate of the area 
based emergency preparedness in Norway in the early years of the new decennium has conﬁrmed this importance 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
The offshore operations in the Norwegian sector are being extended into more northern waters, and have 
already entered into the Barents Sea, although not yet with permanent operational presence. There may be a 
need to revisit the balance between pre- ventative safety and emergency preparedness for the extension of 
permanent operational presence into the Barents Sea areas. 
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